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This document is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or part without permission of the Commandant, The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair In view of the Soviet Union's growing interest in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area, NATO's Southern Region, neglected for over 30 years, is rapidly becoming a chief area of concern, second only to the Central Region. And yet, its defensive capability is no match for the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat. Turkey, although the most strategically important member in the Southern Flank, is the weakest. The USAF rotational fighter squadron at Incirlik can be utilized immediately and cost effectively, to both strengthen the Turkish Air Force and to develop a combined USAF-Turkish Air Force concept of operations that will enhance the deterrent posture of the entire Southern Region.
iii BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Colonel Samuel E. Porter, USAF, became interested in United States Air Force-Turkish Air Force combined operations while serving as a tactical fighter squadron commander at Hahn AB, Germany from 1980 to 1982. His squadron, along with other USAF units shared the responsibility, on a rotational basis, for maintaining a USAF presence at Incirlik AB in south central Turkey. It was during these tours of temporary duty that he had the opportunity to train with the Turkish Air Force and become familiar with concept of operations. Colonel Porter has served with the USAF Tactical Air Forces in CONUS, the Pacific, and Europe. He is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and the National War College. When we look at our own country's experience with allies, we find that early on we only entered into very loose arrangements for specific purposes which followed the lead of our first President who warned against entangling alliances. We were finally forced into WW I by a strong national sympathy for the allied cause, but we were totally unaware of the political and military implications of such a venture. Although the allies prevailed, losses were staggering and the war was unquestionably prolonged because of a division of effort. Each nation carried on its own war while ostensibly fighting as a coalition. The situation was further complicated at the operational level by differences in organization, language, doctrine, terminology, strategy, tactics, and personal prejudice. Unfortunately, most of the lessons that were so painfully learned were lost in the immediate post war euphoria as expressed so vividly by General Robert Bullard, "I saw today a line of eight or ten Americans, French, and British soldiers, arms locked, singing and walking l together in celebration of the armistice and the hope for peace."
Although the U.S. and its allies did little after WW I to prepare for future contingencies requiring a coalition involvement, some of the lessons of history began to penetrate the minds of the political and military leadership so that by the time WW II rolled around at least the U.S. and Great Britain had agreed upon the framework of a combined military command structure.
However, operationally, the allies had failed to develop and exercise combined operations plans, to understand one another's doctrine, organization, weaponry, and equipment, all of which contributed to early allied defeats.
In an attempt to reverse these setbacks, snap decisions were often made that further exacerbated the situation such as the wholesale integration of forces in North Africa that led to allied defeats at Tunis and the Kasserine Pass. Lt Gen Eisenhower probably best summarized this operation in the following statement:
I think the best way to describe our operation to date is that they have violated every recognizable principle of war, are in conflict with all operational and logistical methods laid down in text books, and will be condemned in their entirety by all Leavenworth and War College classes for the next 25 years. 2 However, as the war progressed, the wheel was reinvented and the allies were once again victorious. Throughout the conflict, while turmoil and disagreement raged among government and military leaders, this friction was overcome, as it always is, at the operational level, and the troops got the job done. although it has never been tested on the battle field, has deterred the Soviet threat and preserved the peace. We'll examine more closely NATO's current capability, but let's first look at the Korean War and its multinational implications.
In 1950, the U.S. and 17 other allies responded to South Korea's call for assistance when North Korea invaded. General MacArthur and his veteran commanders, remembering how long it took for the allies to develop an effective force during WW II, immediately set about standardizing procedures and equipment. Still the task was monumental. In addition to the language differences, there were doctrinal disputes, shortage of weapons, complaints about the food, and the Ethiopians even came dressed for warm weather operations. Despite these obstacles, the U.N. Security Forces in Korea developed into an effective multinational organization that was ultimately victorious.
Historically, the problems of interoperability have been so]ved, when they have been solved at at1, primarily through trial and error during the actual conduct of operations over an extended period of time. This is a costly process in terms of men, mater~al, and time. These may be lacking in future wars. ~ Today more than ever before, allies are of fundamental importance. Not only those nations allied to us by treaty, but all nations with which we share common interests. This increased importance of allies underscores the U.S. commitment to maintain a strong coalition military strategy such as exists in NATO. The question is, just how well prepared is NATO to fight a coalition war today? There is no doubt that despite the withdrawal of France and the frequent political fueds among the allies, NATO has come a long way in developing peacetime cooperation over the past 35 years, but it is only in the pivotal Central Region that a strong multinational force has been established. The U.S., Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands have forged both a conventional and nuclear deterrent that has remained unchallenged.
However, when we turn our attention to the Southern Region, the picture looks entirely different. For a number of primarily political reasons, this vital area has never received the attention accorded the Central Region, although it suffers from insufficient resources and isolation. Consequently, we are ill-prepared to fight a major conflict in this area.
If we were to choose the most strategically important NATO partner in the region, it would have to be Turkey. Geographically, it is the pivotal country in the region, it guards access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, and it shares the longest common border (600km) They become even more lucrative with the addition of follow-on forces. To allow for dispersal of these forces, the COB program was developed. Under a multinational agreement, all inactive airdromes capable of supporting tactical operations are being refurbished for this purpose. The concept is exercised to the maximum extent possible with each CONUS unit deploying to its assigned COB as often as funds permit.
FACILITY HARDENING AND TONE DOWN. Facility hardening is also a priority project in the Central Region, but with the exception of aircraft shelters, command centers and operations buildings, few hardened facilities have been constructed at NATO MOBs, and thus they are extremely vulnerable. The plan is to eventually provide the COBs with hardened facilities as well. When funds are available, these hardened structures will also be modified to provide a nuclear, biological, and chemical decontamination and filtering capability.
One of the passive methods of air base defense is called "tone down", which means to make less visible from the air. One of the most common methods is to paint everything including streets, taxiways and runways, as well buildings, various shades of greens and browns. This is extremely effective.
Oftentimes even home-based aircrews find it difficult to locate their own airfield without electronic navigational aids. Some bases also plant sod on top of buildings, aircraft shelters, etc. Blackout exercises are also practiced routinely. In an attempt to simulate actual wartime conditions, operations were scheduled to commence 48 hours after all deployed forces were in place; however, we encountered major looistical problems that had been overlooked by the planners. These difficulties had to be corrected before the exercise could begin. For example, there was a critical shortage of fuel trucks which would have reduced our sortie generation capability to an unacceptable level.
The food for the field kitchen had not arrived from Ankara, and there were less than half the cooks required to man the kitchen. So we ate K-rations for two days and when the food arrived, we converted a number of security police personnel into cooks.
It also became readily apparent that the language barrier was going to pose a bigger problem than had been anticipated. Fortunately, our hosts had selected one of their top officers as liaison officer. He worked tirelessly during the preparation, reception, beddown, employment and redeployment phases to ensure that our every need was accommodated. He was, without a doubt, the most important factor in the successful outcome of this important exercise.
Actually, the problems we encountered at the outset, as well as the unexpected difficulties that cropped up throughout the exercise, created a very realistic environment that required USAF and TUAF commanders and supervisors at every level to develop a spirit of cooperation that far surpassed anyone's expectations.
Because of the language problem, we modified the first week of the scenario, giving more detailed briefings and initially allowing only one USAF and one TUAF aircraft to fly together on missions to the nearby gunnery ran §e. The crews adjusted quickly, however, and we were able to resume the original schedule after the first week. We began scheduling mixed flights on the more complex close air support misions in the Bulgarian Buffer Zone, over 150 miles northwest of Eskisehir. Intially, these sorties were flown by the more experienced aircrews, but as we became more familiar with one another's procedures, everyone got an opportunity to plan and fly these more demanding missions. From the two aicraft element, flights were expanded to four, eight, and eventually 12 aircraft that used advanced tactics to conduct simulated strikes on targets ranging from troop and vehicle concentrations to airfields. The USAF F-15s simulated enemy interceptors which added a dimension of realism that most of the TUAF aircrews had not previously experienced. We found the TUAF pilots to be well trained in the fundamentals of basic airmanship. Their low level navigation is excellent and they are expert at conventional weapons employment, particularly when they use the F-4s computer bombing system. However, they do not take into account the survivability factor when developing tactical profiles. They use the same 14 basic tactic on all missions which makes them predictable and therefore vulnerable. They acknowledge this deficiency, but are reluctant to change because they are concerned that it would affect their bombing accuracy. This is an important area that they really need to work on or their attrition levels in a medium to high threat environment will be unacceptable. They are also deficient in both knowledge and proficiency of employing live munitions.
The TUAF's limited budget does not allow for even the occasional use of live munitions for training purposes. And, althoughtheir inventory includes guided munitions, few of the aircrews have been schooled in their use.
Another area of concern is the fact that they have made little use of the multiple role capability of the F-4. Although they have mastered the basic conventional air to ground mission, they have just begun to develop the air-to-air potential of the system. In 1980, they were beginning to realign their mission priorities and designate some of their air to ground squadrons as primary air superiority units including one of our host squadrons at Eskisehir. Few of the pilots had any knowledge of air-to-air weaponry, tactical intercept geometry, or basic air combat tactical maneuvering. Both the USAF F-15s and F-4s worked with the TUAF F-4s, but little progress could be made in the limited time available. Since then, they have developed their own training program, but they desperately need our assistance in this important area. One of the most productive air defense missions of the exercise involved a combined flight of four USAF F-4s and four TUAF F-4s escorting three B-52s that were simulating conventional attacks on numerous targets across Turkey. It was the first time the TUAF pilots had ever seen a B-52 up close in flight, so it was an excellent learning experience for them, and they were very effective in protecting them against the F-15s that were simulating the aggressor role. The exercise culminated with a twelve aircraft combined raid on simulated enemy naval forces operating in the Aegean Sea.
The mission was expertly planned and flown, although as we expected, the Greek air defense system responded, and we were intercepted by their fighters.
Display Determination 1980 was rated by both U.S. and Turkish officials as an unqualified success with the combined air operations at Eskisehir being one of the highlights. The TUAF immediately submitted a request for an on-going combined training program with the USAF. However, it was not until a year later that the next exercise was scheduled. Coincidentally it involved a small four aircraft detachment from Eskisehir that just happened to deploy to Incirlik at the time my squadron was there. It was a small scale effort compared to Display Determination and only lasted a week, but once again it proved to be very beneficial for both units. We developed a realistic wartime scenario that increased in intensity throughout the week and culminated with a simulated airfield attack on Incirlik using two USAF F-4s as air defenders against the combined USAF-TUAF attack force. This was the standard USAF exercise profile, but the TUAF aircrews had never been exposed to such advanced tactics.
One point that should be made before we continue is that the Turkish fighter pilot is no different than any other fighter pilot in terms of his "can do" attitude and the determination to be the best in his profession.
They are dedicated, loyal, and hard working. They also talk freely about the Soviet threat. They respect, but do not fear, the "Bear" as they call him, but they clearly understand that they will need our help if it comes down to a direct confrontation with the Soviets. It is for this reason that they are eager to continue the combined training program with the USAF. They need extensive training in high threat tactics, battlefield air interdiction, defense suppression and electronic countermeasures. They will also require training in nuclear weapons employment if they once again assume responsibility for that misson. Although they are making progress, the TUAF is a long way from being combat ready in the important air superiority mission area. It's by far the most difficult concept to master, but one of the most important. For without adequate air defense and the abilty to achieve and maintain air superiority over the battlefield, it will be impossible to survive and respond to a preemptive attack. If at least some of the 160 F-16s they are going to buy are assigned to the air defense role, the TUAF will have AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION. The TUAF is currently equipped with the old F-lO0 and F-f04 which will gradually be phased out. They also fly the more modern F-5 in the air defense role and their newest acquisition is the F-4 equipped with smokeless engines and a computer bombing system. They are negotiating with the U.S. for additional F-4s as well as 160 F-16s. In the meantime, the USAF F-16s that deploy to Incirlik can play a key role in the TUAF's conversion program, using the lessons learned by the U.S., Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark during their transition to the F-16. Focusing on the three TUAF bases scheduled to receive the F-16, the USAF rotational squadrons can begin with a basic orientation program, using one aircraft as a maintenance training device as well as for operational demonstrations. In addition to deploying single aircraft to each of the TUAF bases scheduled to receive the F-16, the USAF should conduct ground training at Incirlik for as many TUAF personnel as can be made available. Such a program would not only greatly facilitate the TUAF's conversion program, but enhance the development of a combined operational capability COLLOCATED OPERATING BASE CONCEPT. Turkey has actively participated in the NATO COB progr~n by hosting CONUS based USAF fighter units each year during Display Determination exercises. These have been successful deployments including some limited combined training activities. As funds become available, more designated COBs will be made serviceable, but it's a slow process throughtout NATO. Perhaps the most important military contruction project in all of NATO at the present time is the refurbishment of two bases and the building of a third in eastern Turkey. These three bases will allow NATO to project tactical air power further into areas of potential hostility than ever before. Hopefully, the USAF will be permitted to use these facilities for peacetime exercise training and COB deployments. As Turkey goes, so goes the Southern Region. The entire region, specifically Turkey, has been neglected for too long. I recommend that we act immediately to not only improve the TUAF, but look for cost effective ways of developing, as rapidly as possible, the entire Turkish Armed Forces into a legitimate military power in the Southern Region. A bona fide deterrent that the Soviet Union will never challenge. 
